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WILLIAM AND MARY LAw REVIEW
FEDERAL TAXATION
Depreciation of Assets in the Year of Disposal
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has held various
views concerning the amount received by a taxpayer upon
disposal or sale of an asset which exceeds the undepreciated
and salvage value of the asset as carried on the taxpayer's
books.' The Commissioner has continuously stated, however,
that a taxpayer should not take a deduction for depreciation
for an asset in the year of disposal if a gain would result,
notwithstanding the fact that the asset sold for more than
its estimated salvage value.2 Recently three Federal District
Courts allowed taxpayers to recognize capital gains upon
disposal of assets when the amounts exceeded the combined
undepreciated value and salvage value.3
In S & A Company v. United States,4 the taxpayer was
a going concern with a business year ending on August 31st.
On April 1, 1956, S & A sold its assets to McCulloch Corpo-
ration, who in turn assumed S & A's liabilities. McCulloch
continued to run the company under much the same policy
and work force as did the taxpayer. The consideration for
the sale of the assets exceeded the undepreciated basis of
the assets at the close of the 1955 business year; however,
S & A, in their 1956 federal corporation income tax return,
deducted depreciation on the assets for the time of their
use in 1956. The Internal Revenue Bureau declared the de-
duction invalid because the assets were sold for an amount
greater than the undepreciated basis as of the end of the
1955 business year. (In effect, the Internal Revenue Service
1 Massey Motors Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 80 Sup. Ct. 1411;
4 L.Ed. 2d 1592 (1960).
2 Rev. Rul. 62-92, 1962-1 Gum. Bull. 29: The depreciation deduction
for the taxable year of disposition of an asset used in trade or
business. . .is limited to the amount, if any, by which the adjusted
basis of the asset at the beginning of the year exceeds the amount
realized from sale or exchange.
3 S & A Company v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 677 (D. Minn.
1963). Motorlease Corporation v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 356(D. Conn. 1963). Kimball Gas Products v. United States-, F.
Supp.,-, CCII 63-2 USTC 19507 (Texas 1963).
4 218 F. Supp. 677 (D. Minn. 1963).
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used Revenue Ruling 62-92,5 although they did not plead it
as such.) The taxpayer claimed that if the depreciation de-
duction was not allowed, then the government would be
equating the selling price of the assets, when greater than
the undepreciated basis, to the salvage value of the assets.
Does the selling price of business assets equal the salvage
value of the assets?
The Internal Revenue's main point is that when a tax-
payer purchases an asset for business production, he should
not realize a profit upon disposal of the asset. Its desire to
prevent profit upon the disposal of business assets moti-
vates the above decision. Theorectically, the only reason
for purchasing a business asset is either to maintain or
increase production. Since no business asset lasts forever,
its cost minus salvage value must be written off during its
useful life. The Commissioner contends that a profit is
realized upon the sale of a business asset only when the
taxpayer's rate of depreciation is too high or the estimated
salvage value is too low; therefore, if the taxpayer reports
this profit as a capital gain, he will deprive the government
of revenue which it should have received in previous years
if the depreciation had been taken at a lower rate.
The government fails to realize that the assets could
have been depreciated during a period of inflation. Assume
that an asset with a twenty year life is purchased in 1945
and is disposed of in 1955. Under conservative orthodox
accounting principles the taxpayer in 1945 would determine
the salvage value of the asset in '1945 purchasing dollars'.
He would then pick a method of depreciation recognized by
the Internal Revenue Service, and apply it to the remainder
of the asset's purchase price in terms of '1945 dollars'. He
would be allowed no deduction for inflation under the tax
laws, nor under any principles of accounting. Since no ad-
justment is allowed for inflation, in 1955 the asset is carri-
ed on the books in '1945 dollars', but is sold for '1955 pur-
chasing dollars'. The taxpayer receives more dollars numer-
ically than he is carrying the asset for, but they are '1955
5 Supra., note 2.
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purchasing dollars' purchasing an asset appraised in '1945
purchasing dollars'. He probably has no more purchasing
power and perhaps even less than if he had the adjusted
dollars and was back in 1945. Since no accurate way of
measuring inflation exists, it would seem more just in a
situation where an asset's depreciation rate is reasonable
and the salvage value adequate at the time of purchase to
consider any gain realized upon disposal as appreciation
and tax it at a lower rate.
The favorable decisions in S & A v. United States,6 and
other recent cases hinge on the interpretation of Treasury
Regulation § 1.-167 (a)-1(b), Treasury Regulation § 1.-
167 (a)-l(c),s and Revenue Ruling 62-92.9
The government contends that the useful life of an
asset is the useful life to the taxpayer in his business. Treas.
Reg. § 1.-167 (a)-1(b) could very easily be interpreted
in this way. The government goes further; however, and
6 Supra., note 4.
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.-167 (a)-1(b): Useful Life. For the purpose of
section 167 the estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily
the useful life inherent in the asset but is the period over which
the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the tax-
payer in his trade or business or in the production of his income.
This period shall be determined by reference to his experience
with similar property taking into account present conditions and
probable future developments.. .The estimated remaining life may
be subject to modification by reason of conditions known to exist
at the end of the taxable year and shall be redetermined when
necessary regardless of the method of computing depreciation.
However, estimated remaining useful life shall be redetermined
only when the change in useful life is significant and there is a
clear and convincing basis for redetermination.
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.-167 (a)-1(c): Salvage. Salvage value is the
amount (determined at the time of acquisition) which is estimated
will be realized upon sale or other disposition of an asset when
it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's trade or business or is
to be retired from service by the taxpayer. Salvage value shall
not be changed at any time after the determination made at the
time of acquisition merely because of changes in price levels. How-
ever if there is a redetermination of useful life under the rules of
paragraph (b) of this section, salvage value may be redetermined
based upon facts known at the time of such redetermination of
useful life... If the taxpayer's policy is to dispose of assets which
are still in good operating condition, the salvage value may repre-
sent a relatively large proportion of the original basis of the
asset. . .but in no event shall an asset (or an account) be de-
preciated below a reasonable salvage value. ...
9 Supra., note 2.
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cites Massey Motors Inc. v. United States,10 in which the
taxpayer intended to use the assets for only part of their
life. In the present case S & A intended to use the assets
for their full life. The court, in S & A, holds that useful
life does not necessarily mean useful life to the taxpayer,
but useful life within the industry. This does not run con-
trary to Massey Motors Inc. because the assets were auto-
mobiles in a rental agency. Although the autos had a useful
life physically, they were not useful as far as the industry
i.e. auto rental, was concerned. In S & A, McCulloch con-
tinued to use the assets within the industry for which they
were purchased.
Linked with useful life and depreciation is the salvage
value of an asset. The Internal Revenue Service claims that
one may redetermine salvage value in view of Cohn v.
United States," but the assets in Cohn differ from the
assets in S & A. In Cohn th assets were at the end, or near
the end, of their useful lives and the issue was whether the
salvage value could be readjusted in view of the useful life
nearing an end. In point with the present case is the power
of altering the salvage value expressed in Treas. Reg.
§ 1-167 (a) -1(c). It states that the salvage value is deter-
mined upon acquisition in view of the asset's useful life to
the purchaser when purchased. Price levels should not in-
fluence changing the salvage value. Only if the useful life
is changed can the salvage value be changed. In S & A the
useful life was not changed, nor were the assets at the end
of their useful lives and so the salvage value could not be
changed.
Wier Long Leaf Co. v. C.I.R.,12 discusses both sides of
the argument presented in S & A. In Wier Long Leaf there
are two types of assets: (1) those near the end of their use-
ful life, and (2) those still having a useful life. The court
permitted readjustment of the salvage value of the first
group, but denied readjustment as to the second group of
10 Supra., note 1.
11 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir., 1958).
12 9 T.C. 990 (1957).
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assets which were sold for more than their undepreciated
value. The court held that the profit realized was ap-
preciation.
The court in S & A commented on the applicability of
Revenue Ruling 62-92, to the present case, although the
Commissioner did not plead it. It held that the Ruling in-
terpreted the Cohn'3 case, but as written covered a broader
area than the case. The court therefore held it either in-
valid as law or limited to facts similar to those in Cohn.
Considering the arm's length transaction between S & A
and McCulloch, along with recent inflation, the S & A de-
cision seems valid. It draws valid distinctions between the
sale of a going concern and a salvage sale; and between ap-
preciation and salvage value. Two other Federal District
Courts have independently interpreted Treasury Regula-
tions § 1.-167 (a)-1 (b) and § 1.-167 (a)-1 (c) in a similar
manner.'
4
Motorlease v. United States,15 cited in S & A, went fur-
ther than S & A: It held that Congress in passing 26 U.S.C.
§ 1245,16 impliedly admitted that companies could realize a
capital gains on assets sold for more than undepreciated
value before 1962.
13 Supra., note 11.
14 Supra., note 3.
15 215 F. Supp. 356 (D. Conn. 1963).
16 26 USC § 1245 Gain from Disposition of Certain DepreciablU
Property.
a General Rule-
(1) Ordinary Income-Except as otherwise provided in this
section, if section 1245 property is disposed of during a
taxable year beginning after December 31, 1961 the
amount by which the lower of
(a) the recomputed basis of the property, or
(b) (i) in the case of a sale, exchange or involuntary
conversion, the amount realized or
(ii) in the case of any other disposition, the fair
market value of such property,
exceeds the adjusted basis of such property shall be
treated as gain from the sale or exchange of property
which is neither a capital asset nor property described
in section 1231. Such gain shall be recognized notwith-
standing any other provision of this subtitle.
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In view of 26 U.S.C. § 1245, profits realized upon the
sale of assets, with certain qualifications, after December
31, 1961, will now be taxed as ordinary income. The act
however, is not retroactive, and therefore, one tax service
has advised in view of the decision in S & A, to file a claim
where profits from the sale of assets before December 31,
1961, were taxed as regular income by the Commissioner.17
This assumes the statute of limitations is not a bar.
17 Alexander Hamilton Institute, Taxes Interpreted, Vol. 2. No. 4.
